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Abstract: Following Amartya Sen's approach, John Davis and Solange Regina 
Marin look at individual and social reasoning when examining the complex 
relationship between identity and democracy. They characterize democracy as 
a process of social or public reasoning that combines the individual reasoning 
of all citizens. Identity is explained in terms of personal identity, social 
identity, and individual identity. They argue that democracy in combining the 
individual reasoning of all citizens responds to individuals’ different personal 
identity concerns and needs, reflects their shared social identity interests and 
goals, and accords them rights and responsibilities associated with their many 
different individual identities. 
Keywords: freedom capabilities agency individual identity social 
identity Amartya Sen  
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Introduction 
Sen writes: ‘Rationality is … the discipline of subjecting one's 
choices – of actions as well as of objectives, values and priorities – to 
reasoned scrutiny’ (Sen, 2000b: 4). To say what is rational for us to 
choose, we need to examine our underlying reasons, and also our 
objectives, values, and priorities. Or, we need to determine whether 
our reasons for acting are ‘really sustainable’ where this includes ‘the 
critical sustainability’ of our objectives, values, and priorities (Sen, 
2007). But how does one scrutinize one's objectives, values, and 
priorities? Sen does not believe this goes on in a personal vacuum with 
the individual cut off from others. Yet, if we engage in self-
examination of our reasons for acting, we are somehow independently 
responsible for our choices. How are these two sides to determining 
‘the critical sustainability’ of our objectives, values, and priorities 
reconciled? 
In this paper, we examine these questions in relation to 
individual and social reasoning, interpreted in terms of the relationship 
between identity and democracy. Democracy is understood as a 
process of social reasoning, which combines the individual reasoning of 
all citizens. Identity is seen in terms of personal identity, social 
identity, and individual identity. Democracy as a process of social 
reasoning combines the individual reasoning of all citizens, responds to 
individuals’ different personal identity concerns, reflects their shared 
social identity interests and goals, and accords them rights and 
responsibilities associated with their different individual identities. 
Democracy 
Sen's capability perspective is an approach for evaluating a 
person's well-being, which has its own philosophical justification of the 
choice of weights of indicators of functionings and capabilities. 
According to Deneulin and Stewart (2002), Sen justifies them by an 
evaluative exercise. He proposes a pluralist and contextual account for 
assessing people's well-being, allowing for democratic processes in the 
selection of functionings. He does not prescribe a list of these; every 
evaluative exercise requires selection by an ‘act of reasoning’ 
(Robeyns, 2000: 14).  
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A person is not only an entity that can enjoy one's own 
consumption, experience and appreciate one's welfare, and have one's 
goals, but also an entity that can examine one's value and objectives 
and choose in the light of those values and objectives. (Sen, 2002b: 
36) 
Sen's argument makes political and liberal rights important to 
the process of reasoning and self-scrutiny. He (1999b) argues that in 
regard to the relationship between democracy and economic growth 
the important issue is the impact of democracy and political freedoms 
on the lives and capabilities of citizens. It is relevant to examine the 
connection between political and civil rights, on the one hand, and the 
prevention of major disasters, on the other, because political and civil 
rights give people the opportunity to draw attention to general needs, 
and demand appropriate public action (Sen, 1999b: 150). 
The demand for appropriate public action is related to 
understanding individuals as agents. Greater freedom enhances 
people's ability to help themselves and influence the world, and this is 
central to economic development (Sen, 1999b: 18). The term ‘agent’ 
is used to mean someone who acts and brings about change, and 
whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and 
objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of external criteria 
as well (Sen, 1999b: 19). 
One of Sen's strongest arguments for political freedom is the 
opportunity it gives citizens to discuss, debate, and participate in the 
selection of values in the choice of priorities. Sen (1999b: 153) 
emphasizes that political and civil rights, especially those related to 
guaranteeing open discussion, debate, criticism, and dissent, are 
central to the process of generating informed and reflective choice. 
The social choices individuals make allow for social value formation. 
The exercise of freedom is mediated by values, but values in turn are 
influenced by public discussion and social interaction, which are 
themselves influenced by participatory freedoms. Each of these 
connections deserves careful scrutiny (Sen, 1999b: 9). Social value 
formation thus relies also on democracy, free public media, and basic 
education (Sen, 1999b, 2002b). 
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Sen's connection between political freedom and economic 
development invites one to consider what can be understood by 
democracy and its relation to individuals’ agency. For Sen (1999a), we 
must not identify democracy with majority rule alone, as it has many 
complex demands, including voting and respect for election results, 
but also requires the protection of liberties and freedoms, respect for 
legal entitlements, and guaranteeing free discussions and uncensored 
distribution of news and fair comment. Even elections can be defective 
if they occur without giving different sides adequate opportunity to 
present their respective cases, or without giving the electorate 
freedom to obtain news and to consider competing views. 
For Sen (1999a), democracy makes three distinct contributions: 
(i) it enriches individual lives through more freedom (involving political 
and civil rights); (ii) it provides political incentives to rulers to respond 
positively to the needs and demands of people; and (iii) the process of 
open dialogue and debate democracy helps in the formation of values 
and priorities, and this constructive function of democracy is very 
important for equity and justice as well as efficiency. 
The process of decision-making through discussion enhances 
information about a society's and individuals’ priorities, and those 
priorities respond to public deliberation. Sen (2003: 29) emphasizes 
that from the perspective of public reasoning, democracy gives a 
central place to guaranteeing free public discussion and deliberative 
interactions in political thought and practice. The value of public 
reasoning applies to reasoning about democracy itself. It is good that 
the practices of democracy have been sharply scrutinized in the 
literature on world affairs, for there are identifiable deficiencies in the 
performance of many countries possessing standard democratic 
institutions. Not only is public discussion of these deficiencies an 
effective means of trying to remedy them, but this is how democracy 
in the form of public reasoning is meant to function. In this sense, the 
defects of democracy demand more democracy, not less (2003: 34). 
Sen (2005b) believes public reasoning: (i) involves respect for 
pluralism and tolerance for different points of view and lifestyles; (ii) 
demands an open public discussion of issues of common concern; and 
(iii) encourages political commitment and participation of people in 
public action for the transformation of society. There are reasons for 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Development, Vol 52, No. 4 (December 2009): pg. 500-508. DOI. This article is © Palgrave Macmillan and permission has 
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Palgrave Macmillan does not grant permission for 
this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
5 
 
Sen's life-long engagement and confidence in democracy, which are 
explained by three major contributions democracy makes to a country. 
First, as political freedom is an important freedom, the freedom to 
participate, to speak, and to vote is part and parcel of human freedom 
we have reason to value. Second, a democratic political system is 
instrumentally important, because it gives rulers incentives to respond 
to problems and predicaments of the public (the government must 
take a note of opposition criticism as well as possible electoral defeat), 
and because information becomes more easily available and shared 
with democratic practice. Third, through allowing and encouraging 
public discussion, democratic political systems help the formation of 
values. 
Sen (2002a: 15) believes that participation not only has an 
instrumental role but also an intrinsic value for the quality of life. 
Being able to do something through political action – for oneself or 
others – is one of the elementary freedoms people have reason to 
value. Sen (2002a: 27) emphasizes that democracy is not the same 
thing as majority rule, as democratic rights include the protection of 
freedom of speech and other forms of participation as well as 
safeguarding of minority rights. Beyond that, it is worth noting that 
the process of public discussion and participatory interaction lead 
citizens to take an interest in the lives of each other. 
Identity 
We distinguish three concepts of identity – personal, social, and 
individual. We compare these identity concepts in pair-wise fashion 
primarily to explain the relationship between personal identity and 
social identity. Sen's own emphasis is on social identity (1999c, 2006), 
though it can be argued he also reasons in terms of something like 
personal identity (Davis, 2007). Our starting point is also social 
identity, since we believe the individual in economics needs to be 
understood as socially embedded rather than atomistic (Davis, 2003). 
As the individual is always social, personal identity must be understood 
in terms of social identity. Thus we first suppose that individuals have 
social identities, and develop the other two identity concepts from this. 
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Social identity and individual identity 
Social identity is the idea of individuals’ identification with others 
– other individuals or social groups. In the first case, social identity 
involves an individual-individual relationship, as in identifying with 
particular friends, family members, etc. In the second case, social 
identity is an individual-group relationship, as in identifying with 
groups according to such things as language, ethnicity, religion, work, 
etc. 
Whether social identity takes the individuals (or relational) form 
or the group form, individuals’ identification with others has different 
senses depending on who is responsible for the identification. 
Individuals themselves can identify with others, or can be identified 
with others by third parties. Thus, there are four types of social 
identity: (1) individuals themselves identify with other individuals; (2) 
individuals themselves identify with groups; (3) individuals are 
identified with others by third parties; and (4) individuals are identified 
with groups by third parties. Examples are: (1) a person identifies with 
a sick friend; (2) an immigrant identifies with a native language group; 
(3) social service workers socially identify individuals according to 
family relationships; and (4) statisticians socially identify individuals 
according to race and ethnicity. 
Analyzing how individuals identify with others raises complex 
psychological issues, which we put aside here. When individuals are 
identified with others by third parties, this identification is systematic 
and public, as the third parties concerned are relatively enduring social 
entities such as government, market institutions, media and popular 
discourse, and social science. Important emphasis in this third party 
construction of individuals’ social identities concerns the group form, in 
that these socially constructed social identities are generally built 
around social group categories, or generalizations about collections of 
individuals, that are functional to the social organization of increasingly 
complex societies. But they also result from social conflict and the 
efforts of individuals and groups to exercise power over one another. 
Individual identity is a correlate of the third party-social group 
concept of social identity used to describe the representative 
individual. Individual identity thus understood is a matter of the 
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individual falling within a class of individuals corresponding to a social 
group category, resulting from ascription of characteristics of the class 
to the individual. Individual identity concepts created for social 
organizational reasons include: tax payer, degree holder, pension 
earner, medical patient, and citizen. Individual identity concepts 
generated from social conflict and efforts to exercise power include: 
trade union member, immigrant, welfare recipient, insider trader, and 
terrorist. 
An important dimension of third party concepts of social identity 
and individual identity is the need for stability in their application. 
Social group categories are designed to pick out patterns of social life 
believed stable. Tax and pension systems, practices of discrimination 
and methods of social exclusion, medical service delivery, penal codes, 
personnel files and educational records, etc. function as social tools 
used to pick out stable patterns of social behaviour. This requires 
consistency in the assignment of individuals to social groups. Thus, 
though many of a person's income and employment characteristics 
change over time, that person, nonetheless, retains an unchanging 
individual identity as taxpayer and future pension recipient. Or, though 
a person's health states change over a lifetime, that person's medical 
history individual identity is not to be confused with another person's. 
Accompanying most social group categories, there are 
‘continuity’ tracking technologies that operationalize individual 
identities: names, number assignments, individualized records of all 
kinds, family descent, curriculum vitae, photographs, biometric 
measures (fingerprints, DNA identification, dental records, brain scans, 
iris scans), surveillance, and incarceration or institutionalization. As 
social group categories allow for managing large, heterogeneous 
populations of individuals according to functional relationships believed 
to obtain between them, these tracking tools provide practical working 
systems for these categories’ consistent application. Philosophically, 
social group categories require tools to successfully re-identify and 
individuate individuals in terms of the social group characteristics that 
consistently and uniquely apply to them (Davis, 2003). 
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Individual identity and personal identity 
We assume that individuals are not only objects in the sense 
defined by third parties, but following Sen, also agents or subjects. We 
further assume that being an agent or subject is part of the concept of 
personal identity. Individual identity is purely an object 
characterization of individuals in terms of being a member of a 
category or class of things, and not a concept of personal identity. As 
individual identity is derived from the third party-social group concept 
of social identity, it leaves out what the first three types of social 
identity contribute to understanding personal identity, specifically, the 
role played by individuals themselves in identifying with others 
(individuals or groups), and the role played by their being identified 
with other individuals by third parties. 
This does not imply that people's individual identities are not a 
part of their personal identities. We suppose personal identity 
incorporates all four aspects of an individual's social identity, including 
the many group membership individual identities ascribed to 
individuals by third parties, since an individual's personal identity does 
not exist in a social vacuum apart from the characteristics society 
attributes to the individual as a member of social groups. This also 
applies to the type of social identity produced when third parties 
identify individuals with other individuals, as in the social worker case. 
That others judge a person to have close social relationships to others, 
and see this as part of that person's social identity is not irrelevant to 
a person's personal identity. Generally, what others think of a person's 
relationships to individuals and groups influences what the person 
thinks about those relationships. Thus, we say that an individual's 
personal identity incorporates their own identification with other 
individuals and groups, as influenced by what third parties think about 
this, and all four types of social identity enter into personal identity. 
We focus only on the relationship between individual identity 
and personal identity, or the rows of the table. First consider the 
difference between the two third party ascriptions of social identity. 
With type 3, the social worker case, a person's social identity is a 
matter of an individual-individual(s) relationship, or social identity is 
relational. With type 4, however, the person is simply a member of a 
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class, and only a representative member at that. The statistician who 
ascribes a racial or ethnic social identity to a person is only interested 
in an abstract, non-relational property the individual has as a member 
of a class of such individuals. In effect, type 4 social identity reduces 
the person to an abstract object.1 
Type 4 social identity can be seen as the polar opposite of the 
case of identifying with a sick friend, type 1, since there the individual 
determines the identification with the other, and this is an individual-
to-individual or relational kind of identification rather than 
identification with a social group category. Accordingly, on the 
assumption that idea of being an agent or subject is part of the 
concept of personal identity, individuals are the most responsible for 
their personal identities in type 1 cases, where they determine their 
identification with others and do so in interaction with others, and least 
responsible in type 4 cases. 
Yet, all four types of social identity somehow enter into personal 
identity, and must include this especially strong polarity of being both 
a subject and a third party object. For example, a person can identify 
with a set of friends, and regard it as irrelevant they are of another 
racial or ethnic background (type 1), yet the social identity which the 
government statistician might emphasize may be restricted to the 
person's own racial or ethnic background or other groups’ 
characteristics ‘officially’ assigned to the individual (type 4). Real world 
examples are more complicated, since the government statistician is 
only one of many third parties who assign individuals social group 
identities, and these group identities are often inconsistent and 
competing, particularly where power is contested. Thus just 
considering type 4 social identity alone, inherent within individuals’ 
personal identities, there exist many social identity conflicts according 
to competing social group assignments individuals must reconcile. If 
we add in the type 2 and type 3 social identity cases, the general 
picture is: personal identity is constituted within a social identity 
structure replete with conflicting demands and expectations individuals 
need to organize for their lives to be coherent. 
Thus personal identity includes the idea of being an agent, and 
individuals need to be seen as active in negotiating their complex and 
conflicting social identities to achieve some level of unity as an 
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individual. Broadly, we define personal identity as individuals’ own way 
of negotiating and organizing all their social identities. This view links 
up with two important dimensions of Sen's thinking about individuals. 
It sees individuals as agents, and requires individuals to be self-
scrutinizing or reflexive. Thus a fuller definition of personal identity is 
an individuals’ active and reflexive negotiation of their complex social 
identities. 
Personal identity and social identity 
Personal identity and social identity are not opposed (as with 
atomistic individual conceptions), but for socially embedded individuals 
are defined in terms of one another. Personal identity is defined in 
terms of social identity, or how individuals relate to others, yet not 
reducible to it since it emphasizes the idea of the individual as a 
reflexive agent. Social identity in its different dimensions is always 
about the identity of individuals, yet not reducible to this, since it 
includes third party determination. 
If we associate individual reasoning and social reasoning with 
the two rows of Table 1, they are not seen as opposed either. 
Individual reasoning and social reasoning, of course, include more 
than just issues of identity. Yet questions of identity are surely 
paramount, since they arise whenever individuals and society say what 
individuals are, and whose reasoning combines to produce social 
reasoning. 
 
Table 1. Types of social identity with examples 
Who determines Identification with 
  Individuals Groups 
Individuals themselves (1) Sick friend (2) Native language 
Third parties (3) Social service workers (4) Statisticians 
Here we focus on claims about well-being, and understand them 
in terms of individual and social reasoning as they relate to the 
concepts of personal and social identity. There are two approaches to 
individual well-being in recent economics, often taken to be opposed. 
The happiness or subjective well-being approach (e.g., Diener and 
Seligman, 2003; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006) emphasizes 
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individuals’ own assessment of their well-being (usually in hedonistic 
terms), and the quality of life or objective well-being approach (e.g., 
Sen, 1993; Offer, 2003) emphasizes socially determined requirements 
for a good life (such as capabilities). That individual and social 
reasoning are related suggests we should combine these different 
perspectives. We use our identity framework to do this, and also 
demonstrate the connection between personal identity and social 
identity. 
In the identity framework, the strong polarity between an 
individual being a subject and being a third party object replicates the 
opposition between subjective and objective approaches to individual 
well-being. But as personal identity is a matter of managing the 
different dimensions of social identity, individual well-being also has 
both subjective and objective dimensions. Beginning with the objective 
dimension, a person's individual identities (type 4 social identity) are 
due to the efforts of third party experts to establish applicable 
categories of well-being. For example, consider those responsible for 
the creation of the Human Development Index (HDI). Their aim is to 
establish such categories of well-being as literacy, income, health, 
shelter, etc. that average individuals should achieve as capabilities. 
Public policy then works to change institutions and create access to 
resources to realize these ‘average capabilities’. 
But now consider the subjective dimension of individual well-
being. As Sen emphasizes, different individuals use resources in 
different ways. Further, as people have many capabilities, how they 
combine any given set of individual identities in the form of a set of 
‘average capabilities’ that applies to them varies for each individual 
according to circumstances. Thus, personal identity in regard to well-
being is a matter of how individuals negotiate their many ‘average 
capabilities’ individual identities (here only emphasizing the strong 
polarity between being a subject and being an object of third party 
reasoning). This brings in the subjective side of well-being in terms of 
individuals’ own assessment of their well-being to bear on the issue of 
individual well-being (though not in the hedonistic happiness sense). 
Do individuals’ assessments of their well-being influence third 
party experts’ assessment of individual well-being? Experts are 
subjects too, so when not in that guise, they are also concerned about 
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their personal identities in the space of social identity, and accordingly 
must reason about the methodology of the social categories with which 
they operate. This large topic, however, goes beyond our focus on 
personal identity and social identity. 
In sum, the advantages of casting individual and social 
reasoning in terms of personal and social identity are that we explain 
this reasoning in terms of the dual nature of human beings as subjects 
and objects, and make it possible to refine our normative thinking in 
economics, as in the characterization of individual well-being. 
Democracy and identity 
Social reasoning takes many forms as regards particular aspects 
of social-political systems and with respect to systems taken as a 
whole. In addressing democracy we take the latter stance, and 
characterize social reasoning like Sen as public reasoning. Sen takes 
public reasoning as a defining feature of democracy, which he takes as 
a system of open engagement and exchange in political decision-
making. How, then, does democracy relate to identity? 
The previous analysis treats personal and social identity as 
interrelated. Individuals pursue personal identities framed by their 
social identities, and influence the framing of social identities, thus 
reflecting their dual nature as subjects and objects. Democracy, as a 
form of social reasoning, frames individuals’ political social identities, 
while as a system of public reasoning it responds to and exhibits 
individuals’ negotiation of their many social identities in pursuit of their 
respective personal identities. 
On the one hand, as a system of social identity framing, 
democracy invests individuals with political and civil rights, creating 
the social category of ‘citizen’ and a corresponding individual identity 
for each individual framed in terms of these rights. These rights define 
a scope of activity applying to all individuals who fall into the social 
group category ‘citizen’. That a right applies to all falling within this 
category means that the principle of equality in a political system is an 
outcome made possible in part by third party determination of one 
aspect of individuals’ social identity. 
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On the other hand, just as Sen reminds us that different 
individuals use resources in different ways, so different individuals 
exercise their ‘citizen’ political and civil rights in different ways as they 
negotiate their many social identities and associated individual 
identities. Democracy itself, then, is framed by individuals as a process 
of open engagement and exchange that allow individual exercise of 
political and civil rights. This influences society's determination of what 
rights and capabilities individuals on average ought to have. For 
example, if individuals have the right to religious freedom, but many 
individuals are non-believers, the right to religious freedom is 
interpreted to include non-belief. ‘Citizen’ rights are thus like the 
‘average capabilities’ of the HDI. Their exercise both determines which 
individual functionings make up the political side of individuals’ social 
identities, and contributes to the social determination of which rights 
and capabilities individuals on average have. 
Essential capabilities 
We turn to the issue of essential capabilities. Nussbaum (2000, 
2003) has argued that the capability approach requires a list of central 
human capabilities. Sen has argued one cannot fix such a list, because 
we cannot anticipate what future individuals will value, and it would be 
a denial of democracy to do so (2005a). Robeyns (2003) strikes a 
middle ground by recommending a procedural approach to selecting 
capabilities by proposing criteria for capability selection. We agree with 
Nussbaum that having a conception of human flourishing is important, 
with Sen that this needs to be determined in a democratic setting, and 
with Robeyns that normative criteria exist for different societies’ 
selection of capabilities. Our view is based on the relationship between 
individual and social reasoning and between identity and democracy. 
As argued, individuals pursue personal identities framed by their 
social identities, and thus combine individual and social reasoning. The 
pursuit of personal identity, however, is surely a conception of human 
flourishing, as it involves individuals determining what they believe 
best for them. At the same time, what exactly this involves must 
remain open-ended as individuals’ collection of social identities and 
forms of interaction changes over time. Nonetheless in democratic 
societies with their systems of public reasoning, procedural criteria for 
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the way individual and social reasoning combine exist in the form of 
strategies for open engagement and exchange. Systems of public 
reasoning, then, maximize the capability space, and allow individuals 
the opportunities to acquire the functionings they determine are best 
for them. Thus Nussbaum's vision strikes us as correct, Sen is right 
about the open-ended character of capability selection, and Robeyns 
captures the need for criteria for doing so. We summarize our view by 
labelling personal identity the central capability of individuals. By this 
we mean that it is the one capability that must be assumed to assure 
both human flourishing and open-endedness in individuals’ selection of 
other capabilities. 
Conclusion 
Sen emphasizes the importance of subjecting one's choices of 
actions, objectives, values, and priorities to reasoned scrutiny. 
Individuals do not do this in isolation and yet a reasoned scrutiny of 
one's actions, objectives, values, and priorities is a matter of self-
scrutiny. These seemingly opposed ideas make sense if we begin by 
thinking of individuals as social. We explain social individuals as 
individuals who pursue personal identities framed by their social 
identities. Neither concept is reducible to the other, nor can either be 
eliminated. At the same time, the identity framework used here shows 
individual well-being has subjective and objective dimensions. This 
makes it possible to talk about social individuals as individual beings, 
while it reproduces the tension between the individual and the social 
within the individual in individuals’ need to organize and manage their 
many social identities. This tension and the dynamic of choice and 
action to which it gives rise in individuals and societies precludes our 
saying what capabilities ought to be thought essential – with one 
exception. If individuals are constrained in pursuing personal 
identities, their social side engulfs them. Open democratic societies, 
however, can prevent this, and permit individual human flourishing in 
the form of the exercise of a wide range of human capabilities. 
Footnotes 
1In case 3, in contrast, individuals have specific relations to other 
individuals, the understanding of which requires knowledge of their 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Development, Vol 52, No. 4 (December 2009): pg. 500-508. DOI. This article is © Palgrave Macmillan and permission has 
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Palgrave Macmillan does not grant permission for 
this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
15 
 
particular characteristics. We do not further discuss this relational 
aspect of social identity (cases1and 3) here. 
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